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Resumo 
Este trabalho final de Mestrado investiga o papel do relacionamento das 
empresas com o banco e seu impacto nas taxas de juros entre outros fatores. 
Entre outros fatores, as variáveis estudadas são o número de bancos, a 
localização geográfica e o tipo de gestão/propriedade da empresa. Com uma 
amostra de 4478 empresas entre o ano de 2010 e 2017 realizou-se uma regressão 
simples OLS e o resultado obtido mostra que o tipo de relacionamento com o 
credor tem um impacto sobre as taxas de juro. As principais evidências deste 
estudo mostram que informações “soft” são importantes, em especial a 
localização geográfica e o tipo de tipologia da empresa. 
 
Palavras-chave: Relação bancária, Informação “soft”, Taxas de juro. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation paper investigates the role of relationship lending and its 
impact on interest rate among other factors. 
Among other variables, the determinants studied are the number of banks, 
distance from metropolitan areas and type of company ownership/ 
management. Using a sample of 4478 companies between the year of 2010 and 
2017, it was made an OLS regression and the result shows that relationship 
lending has an impact on interest rates paid to the lender. Evidence shows that 
soft information is important, especially the geographical location and the type 
of ownership/management of the company.  
 
Key words: Relationship lending, Soft information, Interest rates. 
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1. Introduction 
Relationship Lending is a lending technology, that the banks and borrowers 
adopt (Berger and Udell, 2006; Vlado Kysucky and Norden, 2016).There is not a 
definition that is universal among scholars, but the prevalent definition is that 
under this technology banks acquire private information over time through 
contact with his owner, community and the firm by its nature. This information 
is used throughout the relationship to make decisions about the availability and 
the terms of credit (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 2002). 
This study has the objective to observe how in Portuguese SMEs soft 
information can impact the terms of the credit and its costs. To answer, it was 
gathered a data base of 4478 Portuguese SMEs from all sectors, excluding 
financial industry and state-owned companies, with data between 2010-2017, 
the focus is to add/provide information on relationship lending in the 
Portuguese reality. Several past works were analysed to build this study on 
how interest rates are impacted by relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 1995; 
Bharath, Dahiya et al. 2011; López-Espinosa et al. 2017). 
Results indicate that interest rates that companies are paying to the lender 
are being affected by banking relationship variables. Specifically, we analyse 
whether interest rates are affected by ownership type (family owned, and non-
family owned companies) which can be explained by soft information of 
relationship. Also, the distance from the main Portuguese centres is analysed as 
a factor affecting the interest rate that is being paid. Companies located outside 
the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto are paying different rates than 
companies located on those areas. This can also be explained by soft 
information (Bonini et al. 2016; Fungácová et al. 2017). Finally, we also find that 
the number of banks that a company is currently borrowing from is also 
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impacting the interest rate that a company is currently paying (Diamond, 1984; 
Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Bharath et al. 2011; Cenni et al. 2015; Matias Gama 
and Van Auken, 2015). 
Concerning this thesis organization, in the second section is presented the 
relevant literature to develop the study. The following section presents the 
main research question of how interest rates are affected by relationship 
lending in Portuguese SMEs, with three different hypothesis that will be tested. 
In section 4 is presented the methodology used to answer the hypothesis and 
the description of each variable used in the model. Section 5 is made a statistical 
description of the data and a preliminary analysis. In section 6 the main results 
are discussed. The last section presents the main conclusions of this study, the 
main limitations of the study and suggestions for further research. 
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2. Relationship Lending Literature Review 
In this section the main literature review on relationship lending is 
discussed. 
2.1. What is Relationship Lending  
This type of lending is mostly related to SMEs (Berger and Udell, 2006; 
Badulescu and Badulescu, 2012; Berger, 2015;), because the providing of credit 
to SMEs is comprehensively different. Typically, SMEs is a constant growing 
sector, are opaque firms in terms of information availability, do not trade debt 
or equity and are highly profitable compared to bigger firms. To overcome 
these opacity difficulties, and to provide credit to SMEs, loan officers and 
lenders use relationship lending technology, where banks collect information 
overtime and use this “soft” information to provide credits that SMEs demand 
to face their financing needs (Uchida et al., 2012). Due to asymmetric 
information these loans would not been granted by other institutions which do 
not possess this type of information. 
2.1.1.  Advantages of Relationship Lending 
When banks are not confident about the type of firm they are dealing with, it 
is common to charge higher premiums on interest rates. However, this 
adjustment would make the borrower to take riskier entrepreneurial projects, so 
it could have higher return and still be able to pay interests without struggling 
margins. With this, banks are not encouraged to grant loans at a higher rate 
than a threshold value, since the higher risks taken by the firm underlay a lower 
expected profit (Diamond, 1984). 
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To mitigate this information asymmetry in the credit market, banks 
implement a monitoring activity. However, in cases where there is multiple 
lending, the incentive to acquire and assess the creditworthiness of a borrower 
is diminished, as the costs would be carried by only one lender and the benefits 
would spread to all. To solve this issue, banks can develop closer relationships 
with firms, especially with less transparent firms (Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 
1984; Fama, 1985; Rajan, 1992). This relationship over time will impact the type 
of investments that the firm decides to implement, it will lead to a better use of 
funds, with higher quality projects and so, resulting in higher expected profits 
(Berger and Udell, 2002; Bolton et al., 2016).  
With the improvement of this relationship, firms acquire some privileges 
throughout the lending partnership. According to Karmakar et al., (2018), with 
the reduction of asymmetric information, banks ask for less collateral on a 
credit loan, an essential feature in debt contracts. For SMEs that do not have 
considerable collateral, this suggests that having a strong relation with the 
lender increases access to credit. These findings are in line with Berger & Udell, 
(2006). Further, SMEs have preferred loan terms and improved credit 
availability when in a long-term relationship lending (Peterson and Rajan, 2002; 
Bharath et al., 2011). 
2.1.2. Disadvantages of Relationship Lending 
The use of such Relationship lending is beneficial to both banks and firms, 
but it can also lead to some disadvantages (Diamond, 1984). 
The main disadvantage that this relationship can bear to the firms, is that this 
lending will give an information monopoly to one bank, and so impose their 
monopolistic power and ask for higher rates (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010; 
Stein et al., 2018). This downside of relationship lending can be reduced if firms 
are willing to diversify away from their main bank (Ongena and Smith, 2000). 
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According to Detragiache et al., (2000), multiple lending, will have a positive 
impact on profitable projects, instead of abolishing perpetually profits if firms 
are struggling with higher interest rates. 
 
2.2.  Effect of Relationship Lending on loan spreads and 
firm performance. 
As seen on the previous chapter, relationship lending can have an immense 
impact on firm performance. The spread that firms must pay for their credits 
can be a catalyst for their performance. The economic and political environment 
impact massively the interest rates that are being exercised, and this external 
variable can impact positively or negatively the firm’s performance and 
investments. According to Gong et al. (2018), a cross-country study in 19 major 
economies over 2000–2015 on syndicated loan contracts, uncertainty-averse 
lenders ask for higher premium when being exposed to uncertainty. On 
average when the uncertainty rises by a one standard deviation the firms 
seeking finance pay an extra 12 Bps on the loan. 
To face uncertainty, firms should establish a lending relationship, otherwise 
they will have to pay higher rates and so decrease their financial performance. 
For SMEs, which are more opaque firms and have less collateral to pledge, not 
only, but specially during a cyclical downturn, having a relationship lending is 
extremely beneficial, suffering less credit constraints (Beck et al., 2014). 
According to Banerjee et al., (2017), after the Lehman Default Shock, companies 
who experienced a longer relationship with the main bank, had their loans 
cheaper, paying lower interest rates, as well as a stronger credit growth. The 
same result was found during the Period of the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Important to notice is that this effect was only visible if the firms maintained a 
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close relationship with well capitalized banks. These results are in line with 
Bolton et al. (2016). 
As said previously, this technology is not only beneficial in cyclical 
downturns but throughout all business cycles, as shown by Berger and Udell 
(1995), SMEs with longer banking relationships will borrow at a lower rate than 
other small firms, and pledge less collateral. The results are consistent with 
Financial Intermediation literature, which illustrates the idea that banks gather 
critical information and see the type of firm they are dealing with, and so, use 
this information to adjust the contract terms (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan 
and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986).  
When banks obtain “soft” information, gathered throughout the lending 
relationship, they reduce the level of information asymmetry and the problems 
of moral hazard are overcome, and with this, firms experience a reduction on 
the spread charged by the bank. This effect can only be noticed two years after 
the first loan was contracted and after that, the bank will, according to the hold-
up theory, charge above cost interest rates as the relationship continues (López-
Espinosa et al., 2017). The result is consistent with Bharath et al., (2011), 
concluding that repeating borrowing from the same lender convert on lower 
interest rates paid. But Cenni et al., (2015), goes further and concludes that up 
until the seventh year of repeated borrowing to the same lender there is no 
benefit to the firm and only after the seventh year there is an indication that it is 
easier to obtain credit and larger credits. Still, this benefit is significantly 
reduced for SMEs due to information opacity. 
Seen that firms can benefit from Relationship lending to pay lower spreads 
on their credit loans, it was concluded by Gmabini and Zazzaro (2013), that this 
relationship does hold only for term loans but can have a significant impact on 
firm’s stability and growth rate.   
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But for this technology to accomplish benefits for both, borrower and lender, 
the match of the firm with the main bank must be optimal. According to Ferri 
and Murro (2015), a firm might end up with a type of bank that differs from the 
expected and needed, translating to future problems as switching costs may 
keep the firm with the same lender, forming an “odd” couple that does not 
deliver any benefit for both parties involved. If those costs would be lower and 
if measures were adopted to increase transparency of a bank’s lending 
technology, the probability of forming “odd” couples would be reduced. 
 
2.3. Impact of banking competition, debt held and years 
of relationship with the main lender 
The longevity of the lending relationship and its effects is a subject that is 
being studied on later in the XX century until now. We can say that the clear 
majority of academic theories agree that long-term lending relationships are 
beneficial, on many levels, to firms in general, but especially for SMEs and 
especially during downturns of business cycles (López-Espinosa et al., 2017). 
Although the influence of this technology seems to have different impact 
according to the firm financial health, to Agostino and Trivieri (2018), SMEs are 
always benefited with longer relationships, although having less significant 
impact on SMEs with weaker financial health. Controversially to the literature, 
Elsas (2005) found that years of lending relationship have absolutely no 
correlation with any benefit that companies might have, but what it is 
important explaining lending relationship is the percentage of credit share of 
the main bank and the number of banks the firm works with.  
  The benefits of having a lasting lending relationship can vary, but the main 
and the more direct consequences are on collateral pledged on each credit loan, 
lower interests paid and less credit constraints with easier access to credit loans 
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(Cenni et al., 2015; Banerjee et al., 2017; Anderson et al., 2018). Comparing SMEs 
with more transparent firms, the credit rationing is always more significant to 
opaquer firms, even when having lasting relationships than to transparent 
firms, even in the beginning of the relationship. Yet, this rationing gap between 
more opaque and transparent firms decreases over time as the bank gather 
critical information about the opaquer firm (Kirschenmann, 2016). Even when 
firms have easier access to credit loans, Badulescu and Badulescu (2012), found 
that there is a large gap between the credit supply and the amount of credits 
and the firm expectation. Firms expect their lending relationship to support not 
only for loans but also for trust, support and partnership. To the authors the 
fact that the gap exists is explained by the reluctance of banks to SME firms. 
Relationship lending can be so powerful that if SMEs and Banks seek a long-
term relationship and connect it with the theory that if banks held a bigger 
equity capital buffer in anticipation of a crisis, the real effects of crisis on 
corporate investment and economic activity would be significantly reduced 
(Bolton et al., 2016). In contrast to the theory mentioned, to Stein (2015), SMEs 
are being damaged when exposed to longer banking lending relationships. This 
finding relies on the fact that SMEs trust exclusively on banks and therefore 
they have a lower negotiation power, so banks can impose their terms and so 
they can increase interest rates on loans if necessary. 
For SMEs, this long relationship should be associated with a more 
concentrated debt around the main bank (Cenni et al., 2015). SMEs approach 
more stable banks with less liquidity problems since those banks have higher 
deposits ratios and so these banks can provide loans with better conditions 
constantly. Commonly, firms do have more than one lender, but at the same 
time they maintain a long-lasting relationship with the main bank, which holds 
a higher debt percentage of the firm. This result is confirmed by Stein et al., 
(2018), concluding that opaquer firms, such as SMEs, focus their borrowing on 
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one bank only, translating to a more stable relation with that lender. The firms 
that tend to more frequently switch or have multiple lending are generally 
small, young firms that have high growth opportunities with high leverage 
ratios (Ongena and Smith, 2001). For Degryse and Ongena (2001), these types of 
firms tend to start with a single banking relationship and when they start to 
grow and continue to implement good projects with great results, the tendency 
is to keep the relationship with the same lender. Even though, to Guida and 
Sabato (2017), SMEs that have an exclusive banking lending relationship, tend 
to negatively affect their leverage ratios. SMEs with lower equity ratios and less 
profitable firms, are less likely to switch banks to obtain loans as the rates that 
other banks would ask to a riskier firm with high debt ratio and low 
profitability would be significantly higher than continuing with the same 
lender. The switching is explained by the fact that companies are sceptical of 
their relationship lender and so they want to avoid a rising costs from 
information exclusivity. If the firm is bonded to only one bank, and later if they 
apply for a loan on a different bank, the firm might face an adverse selection 
problem and the bank may ask for a “lemons” premium or even worst, refuse 
to provide the loan (Stein et al., 2018). 
On the other hand, when the projects do not produce such as good results, 
firms are more likely to change or to add banks, so they can try to meet their 
financial needs, even if paying higher rates. But, the fact that firms look for a 
new relationship to Gopalan et al., (2011), is explained by the need of firms to 
expand their access to credit and overcome borrowing constraints and not to 
the success of firm projects . On average, when forming a new relationship, the 
borrower obtains larger loans amounts. 
As we can conclude, literature is not very conclusive regarding the multiple 
vs single relationship lending approach. On one hand, literature concludes that 
the costs of credit and credit rationing will be lower when having a lower 
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number of lenders (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Bharath et al., 2011; Cenni et al., 
2015). Other literature found that multiple lending will impact negatively the 
performance of a firm (Castelli et al., 2012).  
Not having multiple lenders does not mean having only one lender. This is 
due to the enormous disadvantages the borrower will suffer, that has to do with 
the fact that the lender could exercise a monopolistic relationship by extracting 
higher rents to the firm (Matias Gama and Van Auken, 2015). But an exclusive 
relationship can also reduce the likelihood of a firm falling to a financial crisis 
and its subsequent liquidation (Carmignani and Omiccioli, 2007).  
According to Duqi et al., (2018), the existence of alternative source of 
financing reduces the bank ability to threaten a long-lasting relationship 
situation. But firms that rely on multiple bank lending situation, tend to turn off 
the fresher relationships and build a long-term relation with one bank only, 
usually the most relevant to the firm.  
Boot and Thakor (2000), concluded that it is important to distinguish two 
different types of competitions: interbank competition and capital market 
competition. Increasing interbank competition will raise the number of banking 
relationships loans, lowering the added value for the borrowers. Increasing 
capital market competition will reduce the number of banking relationship 
loans, but each relationship loan does have a greater value for borrowers. 
Empirical evidence concludes that the probability of SMEs being credit rationed 
increases when the competition in the banking market is reduced (Canales and 
Nanda, 2012). When on a highly competitive environment, SMEs tend to have 
more banking relationships and so experience fewer credit constraints 
(Neuberger et al., 2008). 
Bonini et al., (2016) pointed that jointly, relationship lending and market 
competition could influence the cost of borrowing to the firm. The result 
obtained can explain the controversial results of previous literature on the 
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impact of relationship lending on the cost of credit. If relationship lending is 
only measured as the number of years of relationship with the main bank is 
interacted with banking competition variable, the results suggests that duration 
can affect negatively the costs of credit only when the market is competitive. 
These results were later confirmed by Fungácová et al., (2017) , by studying 20 
European countries over the period of 10 years, from 2001 to 2011, the authors 
concluded that cost of debt increases on more competitive environments, and 
added that the positive side of banking competition is stronger for smaller 
firms. That is related to the fact that a lack of competition incentivizes banks to 
invest in soft information. The positive effect of banking competition however 
is influenced by the institutional and economic framework, as well as by the 
crisis. Contrarian is the findings of Elsas (2005), concluding that relationship 
lending is more likely when the level of competition increases in the market. 
Other studies such as, Agostino and Trivieri (2010), focused on the 
association between bank competition and firm performance. Finding that 
borrowers that receive funding on a less competitive market have lower 
profitability than those firms that are financed in a more competitive 
environment. Controversially, Rogers (2011), argues that there is lower growth 
on more competitive markets and lower firm performance. The reason for the 
result is that when more competitive markets are in place, it is harder to stablish 
stable and log-term credit relationships.  
A study on Chinese SMEs concluded that a more intense banking 
competition is signal that firms have a lower probability to have credit 
constraints, this gap is filled by city commercial banks and not state-owned 
banks (Chong et al., 2013). Same findings as Ryan et al., (2014), but they added 
that the constraints are stronger on financial systems that are more bank 
dependent. 
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2.4. Impact of Size and distance that separates the 
lender and the borrower 
Another determinant factor that impacts the choice of borrower or the lender 
to engage in relationship lending technology is the geographical distance 
between the firm and the borrower. The increase in “hard” information 
technologies allows loans to be handed out by more distant banks. However, 
for SMEs that are more opaque firms with less financial control over their 
statements, the use of “hard” technologies become less relevant and “soft” 
information takes charge. Several studies point to the fact that smaller 
borrowers tend to be geographically close to the credit providers to access 
“soft” information easier (Agostino and Trivieri, 2018). Therefore, this lending 
technology is beneficial since close by lenders have an advantage because they 
can obtain a greater amount of soft information at lower costs (Patti and Gobbi, 
2001; Peterson and Rajan, 2002). This also means that firms that are more 
distant to urban areas will have higher costs of debt because of information 
disadvantages, and the monitoring by the lender is not that meticulous, 
subsequently, lenders charge higher rates to the borrower (Arena and Dewally, 
2012). Also, to Agarwald and Hauswald (2010), bank-firm proximity can boost 
the market power of the bank and subsequently take advantage of this factor 
and charge higher interest rates. Also, when a firm is facing some degree of  
financial distress, the bank can provide more efficient liquidity to the distressed 
firms if they are regionally active and have a close and lasting relationship with 
the firm (Hower, 2016). 
This information of local borrowing is in the hands of the managers of local 
bank branches and sometimes it can be a problem to transport the information 
gathered to the bank’s higher hierarchical levels. The literature existing on this 
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topic seems to agree that lenders whose managers are near to their borrowers, 
have the potential to make better and faster credit decisions, and so these banks 
have an advantage over their peers, due to the fact there is less agency 
problems and there is a better use of soft information (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
In this sense, bigger banks will avoid using this lending technology due to the 
unfunctional distance, because of this they usually decide to grant credit to 
bigger and more transparent firms located in urban centres. These bigger banks 
will not extend any credit to SMEs that are not located in urban centres, since 
the bank branches are distant from the central operational headquarter, or 
because SMEs are less transparent firms and the information they can gather is 
opaquer (Arena and Dewally, 2012). However, larger banks with more 
hierarchy have a competitive advantage in using loan technologies based on 
hard information give the economies of scale, they are better at evaluating, 
processing and collecting it, but have a disadvantage using relationship lending 
because with this case they must gather soft information on the firm (Presbitero 
and Zazzaro, 2011). 
According to Uchida et al., (2012), it is true that soft information is more 
relevant for smaller banks, but they also put more effort than their larger peers. 
Finding no evidence that loan officers are incapable of producing this type of 
information and potentially underwrite relationship credits. If larger banks 
altered their activities, they would be able to produce more and better soft 
information of their borrowers than smaller banks. If bigger banks would 
permit their local branch managers to interact frequently with customers and 
delegate financing decisions to a lower level granting branches more autonomy, 
that alone would make it possible for bigger banks to seek this lending 
technology with their borrower (Canales and Nanda, 2012; Uchida et al., 2012; 
Bartoli et al., 2013). Berger et al., (2014), with data gathered from a survey Small 
Business Finance of 2003 sample, it was concluded that bigger banks are now, 
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more than ever, using this lending technologies and lending to small and more 
opaque firms, due to the fact of more banking deregulation existing in the US 
market.  
According to Cenni et al., (2015), the proximity variable was not significant 
explaining any benefits to SMEs because of technological improvements, such 
as credit scoring, that allows bigger banks to transform soft information into 
hard and easy to transfer data, which subsequently reduce the advantages of 
localism lending. Also, to De la Torre et al. (2010), all type of banks, small, large 
and foreign banks are catering to SME, but banks with multi-services have a 
competitive advantage because they can offer a wide range of products and 
services on a larger scale by using new technologies, business models and risk 
management systems. All banks see SMEs as a core and strategic business and 
are always looking forward to expanding their links with SMEs. The findings of 
Hasan et al. (2017) are in contrast because they find that when the banking local 
market is dominated by foreign banks do not alleviate access to credit to SMEs, 
in fact, it increases costs, reduces investment and subsequently does not favour 
growth, contrary to areas that are dominated by more local cooperative small 
banks. 
 
 
2.5. Type of ownership and relationship lending 
As seen in the previous sections, some authors defend that there is a 
preference by small banks towards using relationship lending. Additionally, the 
status of the bank, if they are commercial, more profit orientated versus more 
cooperative and less profit orientated, might influence the bank attitude to 
adopt relationship rather than transaction lending (Delgado et al., 2007). 
The cooperative type of bank is more deeply imbedded in local communities, 
where the firm’s capital is deeply related with the entrepreneur’s personal 
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wealth. Therefore, cooperative banks must reach more often for discussions of 
private matter with firm owners (Uzzi, 1999). According to Berger and Udell 
(2002), relationship banking depends on soft information about the firm, the 
owner and the local community and so, the loan officer typically have a strong 
connection with the firm, the owner of the firm and the community. So, the 
transactions with cooperative banks became deeply connected with social roots 
and networks (Neuberger et al., 2008)  
The evidence stacks up in favour of cooperative banks for taking relationship 
loans because of the points discussed before. Angelini et al., (1998) concluded 
that cooperative banks provide better credit terms to borrowers. Ogura (2012) 
find that cooperative banking provides more credit although at a higher cost in 
Japanese communities.  
On the other hand, few studies have been realized to understand the impact 
of the type of ownership on the company profits and costs. However, a study  
on Taiwan SMEs between 2002 and 2006 by Wenyi Chu (2009) find a positive 
relationship between family owned business and SME performance, meaning 
that family owned companies have a higher performance when comparing to 
non-family business, suggesting that it is an effective organizational structure 
for the Taiwanese reality. But when studying ownership type on financial costs 
that a company bears to a bank for their loans, Berger and Udell (1995) did not 
find any relationship that sustains the theory of family companies are paying 
different premiums over the prime rate for their loans. 
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3. Research Question 
 
In this section are presented the main questions and objectives of the study. 
After the literature review of the previous chapter, it was important to study 
“soft” information and how it can impact the Portuguese SME’s interest rates.  
Firstly, it is intended to study if the number of banks that is providing credit 
to Portuguese SME’s has an impact on the interest rates paid. 
(1) H1: Number of Banks impacts the interest paid to the lender. 
Also, it is intended to understand if distance from large metropolitan centres 
impacts the interests paid to lenders. This is, if firms that are located on 
metropolitan centres have an advantage or disadvantage comparing to 
enterprises that are distant from those centres. 
(2)  H2: Being located on a metropolitan centre has an impact on interest 
paid to the lender. 
Lastly, it is proposed to understand if relationship lending and soft 
information can impact the interest rates paid to the lender, depending if the 
company is a family business or a non-family business. 
(3)    H3: Ownership of the firm can have an impact on the interest paid to 
the lender. 
Furthermore, other determinants of interest rate will be studied that are not 
included on the main analysis of the study. 
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4. Methodology 
 
The data base is a panel data, composed by 4478 Portuguese SMEs, during 
the period between 2010-2017. This data was selected to determine the impact 
of some relationship lending variables on the interest rate paid to the lender. 
We used an OLS regression with the model presented below to answer the 
hypothesis raised on the previous chapter. 
 
(4)    𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = α + β1Levi,t + β2ProfitMargi,t +β3Currati,t +β4Quickrati,t  
+β5ArTurni,t+β6ApTurni,t +β7InvTurni,t +β8TAi,t +β9Roai,t +β10CoverRati,t 
 +δ11dNBanksi+δ12dMetrAreai,t +δ13dOwnershipi +εi,t 
 
This model and methodology is similar to the study of Berger and Udell, 
(1995), due to the fact that the subject studied is similar and it served as a base 
for several other studies. The variables were taken from those studies but for 
the Portuguese Market. This model helps to determine what “soft” and “hard” 
is significant explaining the interest rates that the borrower must pay.  
 
4.1 .    Dependent Variable – Interest Rate 
IntRate denotes the amount of interest that the SME has paid to the lender, on 
the total amount of financing debt on a yearly basis. The variable is used in 
Berger and Udell, (1995); Bharath et al., (2006); Gong et al., (2018) as the spread 
paid to the lender, this is, the premium over the prime rate practiced in the 
market. 
 The dependent variable, due to lack and trustworthiness of information 
on the data base set, interest rates per year were computed as a mean of interest 
paid on year D and the D-1. This was to control other costs that are imputed on 
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the variable interest paid, for instance factoring costs, other fees that are 
inflating the real interest paid to the lender. 
 
4.2. Independent Variables 
Independent variables are split in to two different categories, the financial 
characteristics of the firm - control variables - and the relationship lending 
characteristics that relate to “soft” information, the main variables being 
studied. 
Financial characteristics represent the so called “hard” information that is 
more related to ratios and easy to quantify variables. In this study, the control 
variables used are leverage, profit Margin, current ratio, quick ratio, accounts 
receivables turnover, accounts payables turnover, inventory turnover, return on 
assets, coverage ratio and total assets of the firm. These variables are set to 
control for the financial risk that is observable on SMEs in the regression that 
determine the interest rate paid to the lender. 
Lev denotes the leverage of the SMEs. The ratio was computed as total debt 
to total assets for each firm by year. According to Gong et al., (2018), leverage 
firms are more likely to default on the payment of interest and because of that, 
it is expected to be charged a higher interest and Ferri and Murro, (2015) added 
that higher leverage ratios increase the likelihood of credit rationing. The study 
of  Cenni et al., (2015), leverage and interest coverage are the variables that 
translate to a firm creditworthiness. To Guida and Sabato, (2017) and Bharath et 
al., (2011) the use of soft information is able to increase the leverage of the firm 
with SMEs being able to being more in debt compared to their total assets 
because of their access to loans. 
ProfMarg denotes for the profit margin of the enterprise. This is a ratio that 
demonstrates the pre-tax profit to the percentage of sales by year. According to 
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Berger and Udell, (1995) findings, companies with higher assets have lower 
profit margins and pay a lower premium over the prime rate. 
Currat denotes the current ratio and it the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. This measures the ability of a company to pay short-term obligations 
within a year. The study of Bharath et al., (2011) finds that lower values of 
current ratios is linked to SMEs that borrow from relationship lenders 
suggesting that this SMEs that have lower ratios have better access to loans. 
Quickrat denotes the quick ratio of the firm. This ratio provides the 
company’s short-term liquidity position and measures the ability of the 
company to meet the obligation on short term with the liquid assets. A ratio of 
1, means that the company is fully equipped with exactly the amount of liquid 
assets to meet their short-term obligations. A ratio of less than 1 means that the 
company is not prepared to face short term obligations with liquid assets. This 
variable was used as control variable by Berger and Udell, (1995) and it is the 
current assets of the firm less inventory and divided by the current liabilities of 
the firm on that year. 
ARTurn denotes the number of days that a company is receiving from their 
clients. According to Peterson and Rajan, (1994) this ratio is used by the lender 
to monitor the cash flowing of the firm. The ratio was computed as (Accounts 
receivables)/(Sales/days) as in (Berger and Udell, 1995). 
APTurn denotes the number of days that a company is paying to their 
suppliers. The ratio is used in Berger and Udell, (1995) as a financial 
characteristic variable and it was computed as (accounts payable)/(cost of goods 
sold/days). 
InvTurn measures how fast a company sells their inventory. This means that 
low turnovers ratios imply weak sales and excess inventory and vice-versa. The 
ratio was computed the same as in Berger and Udell, (1995) paper, Inventory 
/(cost of goods sold/days). 
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ROA denotes the net income by total assets, measuring the profitability of a 
company compared to their total assets, and so how efficient is the management 
of the assets to generate income. According to Ferri and Murro, (2015) on a 
study credit rationing concluded that a one percent increase in ROA ratio 
reduces the probability of credit rationing by 4,6%, similar results found by 
(Cenni et al., 2015). Regarding loan spreads, control variable ROA is negatively 
related with dependent variable according to (Gong et al., 2018). 
Cover denotes the ability to repay borrowing costs with ordinary operation 
regardless of the debt level of the firm. It is computed by taking earnings before 
interest and taxes and divide it by the interests paid. This ratio is used to 
evaluate the creditworthiness of a company according to (Cenni et al., 2015). 
Although on a study made by Bharath et al., (2011), they have used earnings 
before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortization, which is less logical to 
use to compute the capability of a firm to face interest payments per year. Said 
that, it was opted to use EBIT instead of EBITD and so not inflating the 
coverage ratio. The variable was computed as the LOG of coverage ratio, as the 
paper of (Bharath et al., 2011) to control for heteroskedastic . 
TA denotes the size of the firm by their total assets. It is used in several 
papers as a financial control variable that values the size of each company. On 
the study it was computed the log of total assets to control for heteroskedastic 
as (Berger and Udell, 1995; Ferri and Murro, 2015). 
Relationship lending characteristics or “soft” variables are the variables in 
study. In this study it was intended to study three different characteristics and 
their impact on interest rate spreads. The variables chosen to represent 
relationship lending were the number of banks that a firm is currently 
borrowing, the distance from a metropolitan area and the type of ownership of 
the firm this is, if the firm is family owned or not. 
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NºBanks denotes the number of banks that the firm is currently borrowing 
from. This variable captures the possible incidence of moral hazard (Ferri and 
Murro, 2015; Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Rajan, 1992). 
MetroArea is a dummy variable that takes equals one (D=1) if the company is 
located on a metropolitan area, such as Oporto and Lisbon, and takes the value 
zero (D=0) otherwise. This variable tries to capture the additional information 
that banks might obtain from easier interaction with their lenders (Peterson & 
Rajan, 1994; Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Peterson and Rajan, 2002). To Arena and 
Dewally, (2012); Agarwald and Hauswald (2010), the proximity to their lender 
has a negative impact on the interest rates charged, for the reasons mentioned 
on 2.4. 
Ownership is a dummy variable that takes the value equals one (D=1) if the 
firm is owned by a family and zero otherwise. This variable tries to capture the 
relationship proximity between the company with the borrower depending on 
the type of business and years of family management, as it was not possible to 
access the years of management and years of negotiation with the same banker 
and the company representative. The variable is used by Berger and Udell 
(1995) to measure if there is a difference on premium over the prime rate being 
applied to different typologies of companies, family or non-family owned 
business.  
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5. Data and Sample 
 
On this chapter is intended to specify and explain the database that was 
assembled. Each variable will be defined and their expected outcome. Also, in 
this chapter it will be approached a descriptive statistics and preliminary 
analysis on the sample gathered. 
 
5.1. Data Description 
The data used was extracted from data base SABI covering the 2010-2017 
period. SABI database contributes with historical information of Portuguese 
and Spanish companies.  
To construct the financial variables, balance sheet and income statement 
variables were extracted for all 380,000 Portuguese active companies in SABI. 
Afterwards, it was necessary to compute the following financial data: Interest 
rate by year, Leverage by year, Profit Margin by year, Quick Ratio by year, 
Current Ratio by year, Accounts Payables and Receivables by year, Total Assets 
in Thousands by year, Return on Assets by year and Interest rate coverage ratio. 
Adding to the previous variables, it was also extracted soft variables such as; 
the number of banks on the last year available, type of ownership on the last 
year available and the geographical location. Due to the lack of information of 
database of SABI, the number of companies in the database dropped 
significantly.  
To study the impact of relationship lending on interest rates in Portuguese 
SMEs, larger companies were excluded from the database. This means that 
companies that had one of the following two characteristics were excluded: 
companies that have more than 250 employees or having more than EUR 50 
Million in Sales. Also, companies operating on the financial sector such as 
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Banks, insurance, as well as public traded companies and companies ran by 
State were deleted from the sample. 
It was necessary to exclude 5% of companies with extreme values located on 
the tail. This necessity arrives from the fact that the values computed from 
interest rates are inflated with other costs, such as factoring costs, other fees, etc. 
The variables on the model to study the impact of relationship lending are 
the non-financial “soft” variables: number of banks, ownership and 
geographical location as discussed in the literature review. Variable of 
ownership and location were introduced manually to the data base. Ownership 
variable had to be seen company by company to see the type of ownership that 
reins on each company. For the geographical location, it was seen all the 
locations that exist on the metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, afterwards it 
was checked on the database the companies located on those areas. 
With all the data treatment, the final sample size has 4478 Portuguese SMEs 
that comprehend the period between 2010-2017.  
 
Table 1: Geographic Location Observations Interest Rate 
   Metropolitan Area 1523 3.70% 
Non - Metropolitan Area 2955 3.27% 
 
Table 1 indicates the average interest rate paid to the lender by geographical 
location of the borrower in Portugal. The biggest difference on this study is how 
geographical location variable was threated. Companies located on 
metropolitan areas of Lisbon and Porto, where more population is concentrated 
as well as financial institutions, versus companies that are not located on the 
two most populated areas. 
On this sample we can observe that two thirds of the total sample are located 
outside the most populated area, where bank competition is somehow less than 
comparing to metropolitan areas. These companies located outside 
Table 1 – Average interest rate by geographic location 
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metropolitan areas are paying on average less 0.47% bps when comparing to 
companies located in metropolitan areas.  
 
Table 2 indicates the average interest rate paid to the lender by year from 
2010 to 2017. 
 
It is observable on the sample gathered the effect of financial crisis that 
Portugal was hit at the end of 2010 until 2014, year that Portugal bailout 
programme was finish, on interest rates paid by companies to banks regarding 
their loans. During those years due to economic uncertainty, the interest rates 
were higher (Gong et al., 2018). The bottom was hit on 2013 with companies 
paying on average 5.48% of interest rates for their loans. We can observe that 
after 2013 there is a trend of reduced interest rate year-over-year due to the fact 
of there is less uncertainty and so less risk. In the last obtainable year, on 
average companies were paying 3.42% for their loans, which represents a 
decrease of 206 bps since the peak on 2013. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Interest rate by year 
Panel B: Interest Rate by Year Year Number of observations Interest Rate 
2010 4238 4.04% 
     2011 4438 5.12% 
2012 4396 5.48% 
2013 4345 5.19% 
2014 2561 5.12% 
2015 4410 4.43% 
2016 4405 3.92% 
2017 4478 3.42% 
Table 2 – Average interest rate by year. 
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Table 3: Type of Ownership Observations Interest Rate 
   Family Owned 2834 3.34% 
Non – Family Owned 1644 3.49% 
 
Table 3 shows the average interest rate paid to the lender by the type of 
ownership, this is, if a company is family held or if it a non-family company. 
This result show that there is more family business than non-family 
companies, more than 6 companies for each 10 existing companies in Portugal 
are family businesses. We can observe that the difference on the interest rates 
paid to the lender of family business is relatively smaller by 14 bps than non-
family companies. 
 
 
Table 4 provides information on the average interest rates by the number of 
banks that a company is currently borrowing from. 
On this panel it is observable that most companies are currently negotiating 
with less than three banks. With only 3% of the sample working with six Banks 
or more. The results suggest that companies borrowing exclusively from one 
Table 4: Interest Rate by Number of Banks 
Number of banks Number of observations Interest Rate 
1 1295 3.67% 
     2 1394 3.48% 
3 933 3.29% 
4 467 3.33% 
5 240 2.79% 
6 93 2.76% 
7 36 3.03% 
8 12 3.74% 
9 5 3.34% 
10 3 2.06% 
Table 4 – Average interest rate by number of banks 
 
Table 3 – Average interest rate by ownership type 
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bank are paying more for their loans than companies working with more than 
one bank. The difference is around 19 bps when comparing to companies 
borrowing from two different banks and 38 bps when comparing with three 
banks. This effect seems to reverse with too many lenders, with six lending 
relationships being the most beneficial to companies and afterwards interest 
rates start to increase significantly, although the number of observations after 
seven banks, start to reduce sharply which might mean that the average interest 
rate paid to lenders with seven or more banks might not be reliable due to low 
observations. The results suggest that working with multiple lenders is more 
beneficial than working with an exclusive lender (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; 
Bharath et al., 2011; Cenni et al., 2015; Matias Gama and Van Auken, 2015). This 
does not automatically eliminate the possibility that companies negotiating 
with exclusivity are more prepared to adverse events such as financial crisis 
(Carmignani and Omiccioli, 2007).  
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Table 5 demonstrates the average interest rate, number of banks, percentage 
of companies in metropolitan area and percentage of family business by sector 
of business. 
We can conclude that the three largest sectors in Portugal account for 72.6% 
of the total number of firms in the sample gathered, and these sectors are 
Manufacturing (27.7%), Wholesale trade (24.3%) and Retail trade (20.6%). On 
IntRat NºBanks MetroArea Ownership IntRat NºBanks MetroArea Ownership
Obs 989 2587
Mean 4.21% 2.396 0.164 0.664 4.86% 2.165 0.368 0.673
SD 3.06% 1.404 0.372 0.477 4.91% 1.266 0.481 0.470
Min 0.01% 1 0 0 0.00% 1 0 0
Max 27.25% 8 1 1 80.86% 7 1 1
Obs 1980 9246
Mean 4.53% 2.508 0.263 0.692 4.46% 2.782 0.294 0.606
SD 4.61% 1.498 0.441 0.463 4.41% 1.460 0.456 0.489
Min 0.00% 1 0 0 0.00% 1 0 0
Max 74.17% 8 1 1 89.36% 10 1 1
Obs 203 36
Mean 4.15% 3.080 0.120 0.680 5.69% 1.000 0.667 0.000
SD 3.19% 1.913 0.332 0.476 2.47% 0.000 0.577 0.000
Min 0.05% 1 0 0 0.43% 1 0 0
Max 26.27% 9 1 1 14.08% 1 1 0
Obs 6856 2856
Mean 4.60% 2.126 0.309 0.667 4.72% 2.097 0.425 0.533
SD 43.28% 1.195 0.462 0.471 5.33% 1.144 0.495 0.500
Min 0.00% 1 0 0 0.00% 1 0 0
Max 64.03% 8 1 1 89.45% 7 1 1
Obs 193 247
Mean 3.87% 2.640 0.200 0.560 4.01% 2.444 0.389 0.556
SD 2.71% 1.604 0.408 0.507 3.15% 1.275 0.494 0.504
Min 0.03% 1 0 0 0.02% 1 0 0
Max 16.36% 7 1 1 25.41% 5 1 1
Obs 8078
Mean 4.57% 2.500 0.430 0.643
SD 4.21% 1.429 0.495 0.479
Min 0.00% 1 0 0
Max 83.73% 9 1 1
920
25
Agriculture Forestry and Fishing
Wholesale trade
Transportation
Retail Trade
Mining
Construction
Table 5: Interest Rate by Sector
1089
Commercial and Industrial
Manufacturing
Real state
Services
Utilities
352
381
134
266 1247
25 3
36
Table 5 – Average interest rate and descriptive statistics of Relationship variables by sector 
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the other end Real state accounts for (0.1%) and for that reason it will not be 
included while analysing table 2 content. 
The sector that is most penalized on the interest rates is the commercial and 
Industrial sector that on average paid 4.86% on the period studied contrasting 
with the Transportation sector paying 3.87%, a difference of 99 bps. Comparing 
the three largest sectors, Manufacturing (4.46%), Wholesale trade (4.57%) and 
Retail trade (4.6%). We can observe that these sectors are balanced in terms of 
rates paid, with a difference of 14 bps when comparing the most and least paid. 
When comparing the mean of number of banks’ lending by sector we can see 
that the Mining sector is the industry that is currently borrowing from most 
banks, with the mean being 3 banks. By contrast the Services sector is 
negotiating with only 2 banks on average. When observing the three largest 
sectors on the sample, we have Manufacturing (2.78), Wholesale trade (2.5) and 
Retail trade (2.12). The number of banks by sector differs from sector to sector 
the most with the difference from Manufacturing and Retail trade being 
reasonable high. We can also observe a trend on these sectors that the lower the 
number of banks a company is currently working with, the higher is the interest 
rate paid for the loan. 
It is observable that all sectors have mostly their companies located outside 
the areas of Metropolitan area of Porto and Metropolitan area of Lisbon with 
the Services and Wholesale trade sectors being the most divided within all 
sectors, with 4.3/10 companies being in metropolitan areas. Contrasting with 
sectors of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining sectors, that 83.6% and 88% 
respectively, of companies are located outside the areas most populated of 
Portugal. When observing the three largest industries in Portugal we see that 
Manufacturing (29.4%), Wholesale trade (43%) and Retail trade (30.9%) seems 
that there is no trend between location and rates paid to the lender. 
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Also on the sample obtained, most of the sectors are considered a family 
business with the sector being owned mostly by families counting as much as 
almost 70% of the companies in Construction being family business, on the 
other hand, Services is the sector that is less linked to families, although, still 
most of the companies are family related business as we can see with 53.3% 
being family owned. When comparing the three largest sectors, it seems that the 
ratio is balanced, with Manufacturing (60.6%), Wholesale trade (64.3%) and 
Retail trade (66.7%). It is perceptible that there is a possible trend on these 
sectors, with the sector being less relatable to family business being the one that 
pays less interest rates. This is without looking at the bigger picture and 
examining without all variables, including the control variables that are not 
shown on the table. 
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5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we can analyse the statistics of the full sample and explain the 
mean company on our universe. 
The sample is composed by 33271 observations or 4478 companies. As 
observable from table 6, 34% of the sample is in metropolitan areas, showing a 
dominance of firms being outside the metropolitan areas of Porto and Lisbon. 
The sample is showing that most of companies in Portugal are family owned 
businesses with 63% of the full sample being owned by a family. SMEs in the 
sample have a mean of 2.44 relationship lending banks and a median of 2.  
Looking at financial characteristics we can observe that the mean(median) 
company pays 4.56% (3.71%) of interest to the bank, has around 30% (28%) Debt 
and 70% (72%) Equity, with total assets being around 3 383 420 (1 272 160). 
Profit margin is at 44% (42%) with a low return on assets 1% (1%). A low return 
on assets means that the company is producing low income from the use of its 
assets, this effect is more usual on some industries than others. This ratio is the 
financial characteristic that is most prejudicial to the companies, showing that 
there is room to improve the use of their assets to produce income. 
It is perceptible that the average company is comfortable paying their 
interest, with a high coverage ratio of 20.94 (3.15), the higher the ratio, easier it 
should be to make interest payments on loans. The sample gathered shows that 
Portuguese companies can meet their short-term obligations with their most 
liquid assets, a current ratio of 2.06 (1.54) indicates that companies have 2.06€ 
(1.54€) of liquid assets available to cover each Euro of current liabilities. When 
not considering the inventory of a firm, since inventory takes time to turn itself 
into cash to pay off debt, quick ratio, still shows that Portuguese companies are 
prepared to meet their short-term obligations with a ratio of 1.34 (1.03) 
indicating that the company gave 1.34€ (1.03€) of liquid assets available for each 
Euro of current liabilities. Although a high ratio, can also indicate that 
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companies current assets are not being efficiently used or is not managing its 
working capital well, as suggested by Nobanee (2009) finding that current 
ratios and quick ratio is negatively associated with firm’s performance. 
We can observe that companies are selling their inventory faster than 
receiving the amount in debt by their clients, 96.55 (58.79) days to 110.27 (94.64) 
days. The perfect scenario would be if companies were receiving from their 
clients faster than selling their inventory, which would mean that their clients 
are pre-paying and risk would be less to the company. Although, companies 
are having their expenses postponed, meaning there are paying receiving from 
clients faster than paying to their suppliers which is a wealthy signal to the 
company cash flow statement. The mean difference is 69.23 (26.72) days in 
favour of the company. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Count Mean Median Std Min Max
IntRat 33271 4.56% 3.71% 4.43% 0.00% 89.45%
Lev 33271 0.30 0.28 0.24 0.00 15.40
ProfMarg 33271 0.44 0.42 0.23 -3.16 1.00
Currat 33271 2.06 1.54 2.37 0.01 132.85
Quickrat 33271 1.34 1.03 1.69 0.00 122.17
ArTurn 33271 110.27 94.64 90.63 0.00 698.59
ApTurn 33271 179.50 121.36 236.57 0.89 3129.84
InvTurn 33271 96.55 58.79 114.79 0.86 820.52
Ta (Thn) 33271 3383.42 1272.16 7238.00 7.78 237655.20
Roa 33271 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.90 0.35
Cover 33271 20.94 3.15 87.65 0.00 1575.25
Banks 4478 2.44 2.00 1.39 1 10
MetroArea 4478 0.34 0.00 0.47 0 1
Ownership 4478 0.63 1.00 0.48 0 1
Table 6 – Descriptive statistics 
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5.3. Preliminary Analysis 
In this section we try to predict the coefficient signal of each variable by 
considering all the data reunited until the moment as well as the literature 
review and the results obtained by the main papers used in this master thesis. 
 
5.3.1. Financial characteristics 
Considering the literature review and the statistics of the data base gathered, 
the impact of each variable on interest rates, should be as follows: 
 Leverage might be a ratio that can be related to the default probability of a 
company and so this financial characteristic is expected to have a positive 
relationship with interest rate dependent variable. Ferri and Murro (2015) 
explain it by the higher the leverage ratio of a firm, higher the probability of 
default and by that, there is an additional risk associated to the loan. Due to that 
increased risk, a higher leverage ratio means that the company probability of 
being credit rationed increases and so banks ask for a higher premium on rates. 
The rationale is confirmed by Bharath et al., (2011). A company with higher 
leverage will pay a higher rate due to default risk, concluding that it has a 
positive relationship and being statistically significant. On the other, Berger and 
Udell (1995) show that leverage ratio was not statistically significant to explain 
the premium over the prime rate. On this study, we are expecting a positive 
relationship between leverage and the dependent variable – interest rate. 
Profit Margin variable is expected not to impact the interest rates according to 
Berger and Udell (1995). However Diamond, (1984), show that higher interest 
rates charged to a company where the type is unknown to the lender, will 
reduce the profit margin and so the firms will realize riskier projects where the 
return can be higher but also with more risk embedeed. And so a positive 
coefficient is expected. 
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Current ratio and Quick ratio variables are similar variables as seen previously 
and so current ratio is expected , according to Bharath et al. (2011) to have a 
negative relationship with the interest rates, this meaning that the lower the 
capability of a firm to pay short term obligations within a year, the higher the 
interest rate is being charged for that risk.The result on this study is statistically 
significant at 1% level. The variable quick ratio was only used on Berger & 
Udell (1995) paper, with a negative impact to interest rates. On this study its 
expectable the same findings as Bharath et al. (2011). 
The financial turnover variables: accounts receivables, accounts payables and 
inventory turnover - are used on the study by Berger & Udell (1995) and the 
coefficients are negative on inventory turnover and accounts payable, while 
positive on accounts receivables and so these coefficients are expected on this 
study as well. On this study we are expecting to have the same findings as 
Berger & Udell (1995), which is that these variables will not be significant to 
explain interest rate dependent variable. 
Return on assets variable is studied on papers trying to explain credit 
rationing. The study of Ferri and Murro, (2015) concluded that the variable 
ROA is determinant on explaining credit rationing. According to the study, 
there is a negative relationship, which means that the higher the ROA, lower is 
the probability of the company being rationed. The logic is that companies that 
are statistically more probable of being rationed are companies which have 
weaker financial wealth and are less prepared to face short-term expenses. 
According to this rationale, is expectable to have a negative relationship 
between interest rate dependend variable and ROA financial independent 
variable. This is, a good management of the assets to generate income to the 
company, reduces the rate paid to the lender. 
The total assets control variable is expected to have a negative relationship, 
meaning that the more assets a company has, lower the rate on interest. 
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According to Berger and Udell, (1995); Bharath et al, (2011), total assets have a 
negative relationship with the premium paid over the prime rate, having an 
great significante when explaining the interest rates paid. 
Interest coverage variable is expected, according to a study realized by 
Bharath et al., (2011) to have a negative relationship with interest rates. The 
study concluded that a better ratio of earnings compared to financial expenses 
impacts the rates by reducing the interest rate yearly that a company has to pay 
to the bank. So, on this study is is expecable to find the same result, coverage 
ratio being statistically significant and having a negative relationship with rates. 
 
5.3.2. Relationship lending characteristics 
When analysing the number of banks on figure 1 and literature, we can see 
that there might be a slight negative relatioship between the interest rate and 
the number of banks, suggesting that it is possible that in Portugal, the more 
banks a SME is currently negotiating with, the lower the interest rate. Studies 
on this subject are not all in agreement. Ssome studies, such as Peterson and 
Rajan, (1994; Bharath et al., (2011); Cenni et al., (2015), find that the interest rates 
are lower when having fewer lending relationships. The result obtained on 
these articles seems to be contrarian to the results in figure 1, which suggests 
that an increase in banking relationships is beneficial to the borrowers. 
However, according to Diamond, (1984) and Matias Gama and Van Auken, 
(2015), having only one lending relationship will not be beneficial, but by the 
contrary, the bank knowing that there is an exclusive relationship will demand 
more interest, and so, starting a monopolistic relationship. Nevertheless, having 
a monopolistic can bring other benefits to the firm, such as reducing the 
possibility of defaulting or failing during a financial crisis (Carmignani and 
Omiccioli, 2007).  
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Geographical area variable is the variable that studies the impact of distance 
to the lender and also, be related to banking competition, that is different 
between metropolitan areas and non metropolitan areas. Studies on this subject 
suggests that costs of borrowing increase when there is a more competitive 
environment, due to the fact that when there is less competition in the market, 
banks are incentivized to invest more in soft information (Bonini et al. 2016) 
Fungácová et al. 2017). Transposing the information to this study, it is 
expectable that firms on metropolitan areas, where there is more competition, 
pay higher interest rates to the lender. However these findings are not 
consistent with the study of Elsas (2005) that concluded that relationship 
lending is more likely when the banking competition increases. 
A study by Agostino and Trivieri (2018) concluded that SMEs tend to be 
geographically close to the credit provider. It is more beneficial because it can 
be gathered more soft information about the firm (Patti and Gobbi, 2001; 
Peterson and Rajan, 2002), meaning that SMEs that are more distant to urban 
Figure 1 – Relatioship between Number of Banks and Interest Rates 
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areas, will have higher costs because of this information disadvantage and so 
banks will charge higher rates (Arena and Dewally, 2012).  
Figure 2 indicates that the results found on Portuguese SMEs located on 
metropolitan areas are paying higher rents to the lender when comparing to 
companies that are more distant to urban areas, contradicting the results of  
(Patti and Gobbi, 2001; Peterson and Rajan, 2002) but are in line with (Bonini et 
al., 2016); Fungácová et al., 2017). 
 
 
Ownership variable was approached on the study of Berger and Udell, 
(1995), although the result was that the it had a positive coefficient, meaning 
that family owned firms on that study would pay more interest comparing to 
non family business. 
On this study, as we can observe on figure 3, it seems to suggests that family 
owned SMEs have a lower interest rate comparing to non-family owned 
business and so we expect the opposite result from the study mentioned earlier. 
Figure 2 – Relationship between geographical area and interest rate 
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Figure 3 – Relationship between ownership type and interest rate 
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6. Results 
 
In this section, the results of the OLS regression will be displayed for all the 
variables of the model and those results will be compared with previous 
literature that have studied the impact of relationship lending on interest rates. 
 
6.1. Results of relationship variables 
In order to find the answers to the hypothesis presented in chapter 3, it was 
used equation on chapter 4, for the reasons presented at each chapter. The 
results are presented on table 7. 
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Note: It was controlled for year fixed/effects * Statistically Significant at the 10% level; ** Statistically Significant at the % level; 
*** Statistically Significant at the 1% level. 
All Firms
IntRat [1]
0.09164
[0.00]***
-0.02191
[0.062]*
0.00020
[0.945]
-0.00078
[0.032]**
0.00090
[0.057]*
-0.00001
[0.089]*
0.00000
[0.830]
-0.00001
[0.083]*
0.03511
[0.049]**
-0.00487
[0.00]***
-0.00696
[0.00]***
0.00060
[0.082]*
0.00336
[0.004]***
-0.00280
[0.008]***
Adjusted R2 0.1066
Number of Observations 4478
Lev
InvTurn
Roa
LNTA
LNCOVER
NºBanks
Dependent variable
Independent Variables
ProfMar
Currat
Quickrat
ArTurn
MetroArea
Ownership
Const
Financial control variables
Relationship Lending variables
ApTurn
Table 7 – OLS regression for Interest rates 
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6.1.1. Number of banks impact on interest rates 
As seen in previous chapter, the result expected to the relationship between 
number of banking relationships and interest rates, according to the literature 
review, there is some different results, having to many banking relationships is 
prejudicial to the SME to (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; Bharath et al., 2011; Cenni 
et al., 2015), but also having only a unique relationship might bring more costs 
to the SME due to the fact that the lender might practice his monopoly powers 
and pressure the company by increasing costs, (Diamond, 1984; Matias Gama 
and Van Auken, 2015).  
As observable on table 4, the p-value is only significant to a 90% level of 
confidence, meaning that we accept hypothesis (1). Although it is not very 
conclusive due to the fact that there is some standard variation on the variable 
and we are already looking at the lower confidence level possible. Even though, 
the variable suggests that there might be some statistically significance and a 
positive coefficient. Meaning that for each new banking relationship that the 
SMEs brings to the table, there is an increase of 0.00060% on interest rates. This 
result is alligned with the results obtained on (Peterson and Rajan, 1994; 
Bharath et al., 2011; Cenni et al., 2015). 
 
6.1.2. Geographical location impact on interest rates 
As discussed on the previous chapter, it was seen that according to Bonini et 
al., (2016); Fungácová et al., (2017), markets where there is higher market 
competition pushes the costs up on borrowing but Elsas, (2015) concluded the 
opposite. Although on a previous study of Arena and Dewally, (2012) it was 
concluded that SMEs that are more distant to more urbanistic areas will see 
their rates increased when comparing to SME that are closer to more urban 
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areas. So, it seems that there is not a unique and exclusive conclusion regarding 
this thematic and numerous different results were concluded.  
By analysing table 3, we can observe the P-value is very low, less than 1%. 
With this result we can accept hypothesis (2), meaning that the geographical 
location of the SME is impacting interest rate. This study suggests that 
companies located on metropolitan areas see their interest rates will increase by 
0.00336%, when comparing with companies that are located outside the 
metropolitan areas. These results suggest that in Portugal, areas with less bank 
boutiques, meaning less market competition, have a lower interest rate which 
are explained by the importance of gathering soft information (Bonini et al., 
2016); Fungácová et al., 2017). But the result obtained on this paper is 
concluding the contrary of the study realized by Arena and Dewally, (2012), 
that concluded that companies not located on more urbanistic areas do not 
benefit from relationship lending because to the bank is harder to bring and 
gather soft information from the SME when the companies are more distant to 
the bank balcony. 
 
6.1.3. Ownership type impact on interest rates 
Seen in the previous chapter it is not expectable a significant result to type of 
ownership and its effects on interest rate. But on the pre eliminary analysis we 
might expect that companies that are more family orientated, meaning that at 
least 50% of the company is owned by a family, have an advantage on the 
interest that are being paid to the lender, when comparing to non family 
businesses. This effect can be explained by the different type of relationship that 
evolves between companies and banks, with bank lenders being more involved 
and close to family owned business. 
On table 4, we see that this variable has a P-value lower than 1%. It is clear 
that this variable is important to explain the dependent variable being studied, 
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interest rates paid to the Banks. This means we can accept hypothesis (3), that 
type of ownership has explainatory power to compute interest rates. With a 
negative coefficient, it means that in Portugal, a family type of SMEs are paiyng 
less to banks than non family businesses- The regression shows that a family 
business is paying less 0.0028% to a bank on their loans, than non family 
business. This result is contrary to the result obtained by Berger and Udell 
(1995) that concluded that the type of ownership does not impact interest rate 
which is clearly visible that in this study the case is that it has an impact. 
 
6.2. Results of financial control variables 
By evaluating the results on the control variables, we see that there are few 
variables that have a p-value<5%, which is the standard measurement. This 
means that few variables have impact on calculating interest rates. 
The control varaiables that were found very statistically significant were total 
assets that a firm owns and interest coverage ratio with a p-value<1%. Variable 
current ratio, is statistically significant at the 5% level and return on assets, very 
close to the 5% level. With this the variables that three hard information 
variables that helps banks computing the fair interest rate to ask for a specific 
loan are total assets, interest coverage ratio and current ratio. 
Current ratio result it help banks to find the interest rate that companies 
must paid, a company that is less capable of meeting short term obligations will 
see their interest rate increase, same finding as (Bharath et al., 2011). An 
increase in 1 unit on current ratio will decrease by 0.00078% the interest rate, 
and vice-versa. 
Total assets variable is to be found having the same results as in Bharath et 
al., (2011), meaning that this variable is significant and has a negative 
relationship with the dependet variable. This is that higher the assets of a 
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company the less rates will be paid. On this study, a one percent increase on 
total assets of a firm will decrease the interest rates by 0.00487%. 
Interest rate coverage variable in this study had the same result that in study 
of Bharath et al. (2011), meaning that a company that is well prepared to 
absorve interest rate expenses will see their rate decrease. This study shows that 
an increase of 1 unit in coverage ratio will decrease interest rates by 0.00696%. 
Other financial variables did not have the expected results, such as leverage 
ratio. This variable was expected to have a positive relationship and being 
statistically significant, which for Portugues SMEs it seems not to be the case. 
Considering that the variable is significant at a 10% level of confidence, it is 
showing a negative relationship. This result is contrasting with Bharath et al. 
(2011) suggesting that an increase of one unit in leverage ratio will change by -
0.0219% interest rate. This result might be confusing but it might indicate that 
Portuguese companies are not well leveraged and they could use a little more 
debt to finance their projects, and this might suggest that it is an incentive from 
banks to companies use more debt. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has the objective to present the main conclusions of this study. 
Important to notice that this paper is relevant to Portuguese SMEs across all 
industries, except financial sector and state-owned companies. Portugal is 
located on the tail of Europe and it have a small market with most of the 
companies are SME and so, this study impacts a high percentage of the 
companies located in Portugal. Said that, this study might provide/add more 
insights and help companies to make decisions which might impact their future 
interest rate expenses. Decisions that can be whether to lose the majority on a 
family business board with the introduction of a new partner; a company which 
is looking to change their headquarters to a metropolitan area or otherwise. It 
can also impact SMEs that are seeking new banking relationships to fund their 
needs. Knowing that every decision is going to impact the performance and the 
costs a company, with this study, Portuguese companies have a suggestion on 
how those decisions might change their financial costs. 
With a sample gathered between the period of 7 years, 2010-2017 it was 
analysed 4478 Portuguese SMEs, it was provided an insight and an analysis of 
the relevance of relationship lending on interest rates paid. With an OLS model 
it was answered the hypothesis raised. To be able to provide an answer on how 
and if, relationship lending has an impact on rates, three variables were 
studied, number of banks, geographical location of the company and the 
typology of the firm. Also, it was included year fixed effects on the study to 
pick up any variation in the outcome that happen over time. 
The main conclusions of the study are that relationship lending has in fact an 
impact on interest rates. This study was able to show that a company based on a 
Portuguese metropolitan area, Porto or Lisbon is paying higher percentage on 
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its loans by 0.00336%, on average, than companies located outside those 
metropolitan areas. What was also relevant on the study was that the type of 
ownership impacts the interest rates paid, being more specific, a family SME is 
paying less 0.0028% on their rate than a non-family business. When concluding 
how the number of banks can impact the rates, the study suggests that higher 
the banking relationships that a company currently have, the more interest rates 
is paying, not meaning that having only a single lending relationship is 
beneficial. 
7.1. Limitations and Future research 
The study of relationship lending and the impact on SMEs financial costs, 
collateral and the effect on the capital structure of the firm are very interesting 
studies with colossal potential to be used by SMEs as well as banks. This study 
could have a deeper research, but soft information data is not easy to have 
access, especially in a small country such Portugal. Although SABI data base 
has data of companies in Iberic Peninsula, the data base for all the companies is 
very limited, especially to soft information data. The main barriers of the study 
were to obtain soft information, but other issues were observed. One being the 
fact that a company that is not located on a metropolitan area, does not 
necessarily mean the company is not located on a very populated area with 
access to various banking relationship, the case of companies located in the 
north of Portugal, Braga and Guimarães. The variable distance, if possible 
would have been extracted as the distance in Km to the main bank lender and 
so results obtained would have been more reliable. Other variable on the study 
which could have been more trustworthy, is the number of banks that are 
currently working with a company. Unfortunately, SABI database only 
provides access to the last year available of number of banks that the company 
is currently borrowing and not the historic past information. Having those 
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numbers would be important to have a more reliable time dependent variable 
to see the true impact of reducing or increasing banking relationships 
The suggestion for future research on this subject is to study more time 
dependent variables and how it affects, financing costs, collateral asked on their 
loans and the capital structure of the SME. Suggestions of these time dependent 
variables are: how the number of years that a company and the main bank are 
negotiating and how the percentage of debt held by the main bank affects 
interest rates costs, collateral asked for their loans and the capital structure of 
the firm. Interesting to see these effects on each economic cycle to see 
Portuguese companies are paying a premium during growth periods to be able 
to benefit during downturns. 
 Also, the variables here studied, could be used to study their impact on 
collateral that is demanded on each loan, to see if decreases over time and what 
soft information variables can reduce the amount of collateral provided.  
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